Paper 2014/613 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/613 ↗

A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305

Gordon Procter
Abstract

This note contains a security reduction to demonstrate that Langley's composition of Bernstein's ChaCha20 and Poly1305, as proposed for use in IETF protocols, is a secure authenticated encryption scheme. The reduction assumes that ChaCha20 is a PRF, that Poly1305 is epsilon-almost-Delta-universal, and that the adversary is nonce respecting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2014-08-13: last updated
2014-08-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/613
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/613,
      author = {Gordon Procter},
      title = {A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/613},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613}
}
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