Improved Timing Attacks on ECDSA

Vikram Singh

Paper 2014/636 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/636 ↗

Improved Timing Attacks on ECDSA

Vikram Singh

Abstract

We improve the timing attack on ECDSA in [1] by Brumley and Tuveri. We use the Gaussian heuristic to analyse the length of error vectors in the lattice Close Vector Problem in order to determine the problems which are theoretically solvable. Then we cost each solution using a strengthened lattice reduction algorithm and Schnorr-Euchner enumeration to determine which problems are practically solvable. The original work by Brumley and Tuveri resulted in OpenSSL's ECDSA being updated to remove the timing information they exploited, so that application is not vulnerable to our improvements. However we publish this work as a general advance in side-channel recovery techniques which may be applicable in related scenarios.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2014-08-21: last updated; 2014-08-21: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/636
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/636,
      author = {Vikram Singh},
      title = {Improved Timing Attacks on ECDSA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/636},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/636}
}