Paper 2014/665 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/665 ↗
Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking: A Smartcard Friendly Computation Paradigm in a Code, with Builtin Protection against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks
Abstract
Secure elements, such as smartcards or trusted platform modules (TPMs), must be protected against implementation-level attacks. Those include side-channel and fault injection attacks. We introduce ODSM, Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking, a new computation paradigm that achieves protection against those two kinds of attacks. A large vector space is structured as two supplementary orthogonal subspaces. One subspace (called a code $\mathcal{C}$) is used for the functional computation, while the second subspace carries random numbers. As the random numbers are entangled with the sensitive data, ODSM ensures a protection against (monovariate) side-channel attacks. The random numbers can be checked either occasionally, or globally, thereby ensuring a fine or coarse detection capability. The security level can be formally detailed: it is proved that monovariate side-channel attacks of order up to $d_\mathcal{C}-1$, where $d_\mathcal{C}$ is the minimal distance of $\mathcal{C}$, are impossible, and that any fault of Hamming weight strictly less than $d_\mathcal{C}$ is detected. A complete instantiation of ODSM is given for AES. In this case, all monovariate side-channel attacks of order strictly less than $5$ are impossible, and all fault injections perturbing strictly less than $5$ bits are detected.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-08-07: last updated
- 2014-08-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/665
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/665,
author = {Julien Bringer and Claude Carlet and Hervé Chabanne and Sylvain Guilley and Houssem Maghrebi},
title = {Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking: A Smartcard Friendly Computation Paradigm in a Code, with Builtin Protection against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/665},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/665}
}