Paper 2014/728 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/728 ↗
Unpicking PLAID - A Cryptographic Analysis of an ISO-standards-track Authentication Protocol
Abstract
The Protocol for Lightweight Authentication of Identity (PLAID) aims at secure and private authentication between a smart card and a terminal. Originally developed by a unit of the Australian Department of Human Services for physical and logical access control, PLAID has now been standardized as an Australian standard AS-5185-2010 and is currently in the fast-track standardization process for ISO/IEC 25185-1. We present a cryptographic evaluation of PLAID. As well as reporting a number of undesirable cryptographic features of the protocol, we show that the privacy properties of PLAID are significantly weaker than claimed: using a variety of techniques we can fingerprint and then later identify cards. These techniques involve a novel application of standard statistical and data analysis techniques in cryptography. We discuss potential countermeasures to our attacks and comment on our experiences with the standardization process of PLAID.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-10-27: last updated
- 2014-09-19: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/728
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/728,
author = {Jean Paul Degabriele and Victoria Fehr and Marc Fischlin and Tommaso Gagliardoni and Felix Günther and Giorgia Azzurra Marson and Arno Mittelbach and Kenneth G. Paterson},
title = {Unpicking PLAID - A Cryptographic Analysis of an ISO-standards-track Authentication Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/728},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/728}
}