Paper 2014/785 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/785 ↗
Divisible E-Cash Made Practical
Abstract
Divisible E-cash systems allow users to withdraw a unique coin of value $2^n$ from a bank, but then to spend it in several times to distinct merchants. In such a system, whereas users want anonymity of their transactions, the bank wants to prevent, or at least detect, double-spending, and trace the defrauders. While this primitive was introduced two decades ago, quite a few (really) anonymous constructions have been introduced. In addition, all but one were just proven secure in the random oracle model, but still with either weak security models or quite complex settings and thus costly constructions. The unique proposal, secure in the standard model, appeared recently and is unpractical. As evidence, the authors left the construction of an efficient scheme secure in this model as an open problem.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-03-23: last updated
- 2014-10-07: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/785
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/785,
author = {Sébastien Canard and David Pointcheval and Olivier Sanders and Jacques Traoré},
title = {Divisible E-Cash Made Practical},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/785},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/785}
}