Paper 2014/854 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/854 ↗
Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs
Abstract
Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the $\theta$ step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-10-30: last updated
- 2014-10-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/854
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/854,
author = {Pei Luo and Yunsi Fei and Xin Fang and A. Adam Ding and Miriam Leeser and David R. Kaeli},
title = {Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/854},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/854}
}