Paper 2014/899 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/899 ↗
Side Channel Power Analysis of an AES-256 Bootloader
Abstract
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) using power measurements are a known method of breaking cryptographic algorithms such as AES. Published research into attacks on AES frequently target only AES-128, and often target only the core Electronic Code-Book (ECB) algorithm, without discussing surrounding issues such as triggering, along with breaking the initialization vector. This paper demonstrates a complete attack on a secure bootloader, where the firmware files have been encrypted with AES-256-CBC. A classic Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is performed on AES-256 to recover the complete 32-byte key, and a CPA attack is also used to attempt recovery of the initialization vector (IV).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-03-19: last updated
- 2014-10-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/899
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/899,
author = {Colin O'Flynn and Zhizhang Chen},
title = {Side Channel Power Analysis of an AES-256 Bootloader},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/899},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/899}
}