Paper 2014/934 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/934 ↗

Efficient Generic Zero-Knowledge Proofs from Commitments

Samuel Ranellucci
Alain Tapp
Rasmus Winther Zakarias
Abstract

Even though Zero-knowledge has existed for more than 30 years, few generic constructions for Zero-knowledge exist. In this paper we present a new kind of commitment scheme on which we build a novel and efficient Zero-knowledge protocol for circuit satisfiability. We can prove knowledge of the AES-key which map a particular plaintext to a particular ciphertext in less than 4 seconds with a soundness error of $2^{-40}$. Our protocol only requires a number of commitments proportional to the security parameter with a small constant (roughly 5).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2015-10-05: last updated
2014-11-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/934
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/934,
      author = {Samuel Ranellucci and Alain Tapp and Rasmus Winther Zakarias},
      title = {Efficient Generic Zero-Knowledge Proofs from Commitments},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/934},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/934}
}
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