Paper 2014/959 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/959 ↗
Attacking Suggest Boxes in Web Applications Over HTTPS Using Side-Channel Stochastic Algorithms
Abstract
Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Google or Bing to retrieve the client's search query. In contrast to previous works, due to payload randomization and compression, it is not always possible to uniquely map a search query to a web traffic signature and hence stochastic algorithms must be used. They yield, for the French language, an exact recovery of search word in more than 30% of the cases. Finally, we present some methods to mitigate such side-channel leaks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2014-11-25: last updated
- 2014-11-25: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/959
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/959,
author = {Alexander Schaub and Emmanuel Schneider and Alexandros Hollender and Vinicius Calasans and Laurent Jolie and Robin Touillon and Annelie Heuser and Sylvain Guilley and Olivier Rioul},
title = {Attacking Suggest Boxes in Web Applications Over HTTPS Using Side-Channel Stochastic Algorithms},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/959},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/959}
}