Paper 2014/961 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2014/961 ↗

When are Fuzzy Extractors Possible?

Benjamin Fuller
Leonid Reyzin
Adam Smith
Abstract

Fuzzy extractors (Dodis et al., SIAM J. Computing 2008) convert repeated noisy readings of a high-entropy secret into the same uniformly distributed key. A minimum condition for the security of the key is the hardness of guessing a value that is similar to the secret, because the fuzzy extractor converts such a guess to the key. We codify this quantify this property in a new notion called fuzzy min-entropy. We ask: is fuzzy min-entropy sufficient to build fuzzy extractors? We provide two answers for different settings. 1) If the algorithms have precise knowledge of the probability distribution $W$ that defines the noisy source is a sufficient condition for information-theoretic key extraction from $W$. 2) A more ambitious goal is to design a single extractor that works for all possible sources. This more ambitious goal is impossible: there is a family of sources with high fuzzy min-entropy for which no single fuzzy extractor is secure. This is true in three settings: a) for standard fuzzy extractors, b) for fuzzy extractors that are allowed to sometimes be wrong, c) and for secure sketches, which are the main ingredient of most fuzzy extractor constructions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2020-08-26: last updated
2014-11-25: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/961
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/961,
      author = {Benjamin Fuller and Leonid Reyzin and Adam Smith},
      title = {When are Fuzzy Extractors Possible?},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/961},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/961}
}
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