Paper 2015/1085 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/1085 ↗
Malicious Keccak
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate Keccak --- the cryptographic hash function adopted as the SHA-3 standard. We propose a malicious variant of the function, where new round constants are introduced. We show that for such the variant, collision and preimage attacks are possible. We also identify a class of weak keys for the malicious Keccak working in the MAC mode. Ideas presented in the paper were verified by implementing the attacks on the function with the 128-bit hash.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-11-09: last updated
- 2015-11-09: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/1085
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1085,
author = {Pawel Morawiecki},
title = {Malicious Keccak},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/1085},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1085}
}