Paper 2015/112 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/112 ↗
Re-encryption Verifiability: How to Detect Malicious Activities of a Proxy in Proxy Re-encryption
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new functionality for proxy re-encryption (PRE) that we call re-encryption verifiability. In a PRE scheme with re-encryption verifiability (which we simply call verifiable PRE, or VPRE), a receiver of a re-encrypted ciphertext can verify whether the received ciphertext is correctly transformed from an original ciphertext by a proxy, and thus can detect illegal activities of the proxy. We formalize the security model for a VPRE scheme, and show that the single-hop uni-directional PRE scheme by Hanaoka et al. (CT-RSA 2012) can be extended to a secure VPRE scheme.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-02-24: last updated
- 2015-02-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/112
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/112,
author = {Satsuya Ohata and Yutaka Kawai and Takahiro Matsuda and Goichiro Hanaoka and Kanta Matsuura},
title = {Re-encryption Verifiability: How to Detect Malicious Activities of a Proxy in Proxy Re-encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/112},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/112}
}