Paper 2015/1214 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/1214 ↗
Simple Security Definitions for and Constructions of 0-RTT Key Exchange
Abstract
Zero Round-Trip Time (0-RTT) key exchange protocols allow for the transmission of cryptographically protected payload data without requiring the prior exchange of messages of a cryptographic key exchange protocol, while providing perfect forward secrecy. The 0-RTT KE concept was first realized by Google in the QUIC Crypto protocol, and a 0-RTT mode has been intensively discussed for inclusion in TLS 1.3. In 0-RTT KE two keys are generated, typically using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The first key is a combination of an ephemeral client share and a long-lived server share. The second key is computed using an ephemeral server share and the same ephemeral client share. In this paper, we propose simple security models, which catch the intuition behind known 0-RTT KE protocols; namely that the first (respectively, second) key should remain indistinguishable from a random value, even if the second (respectively, first) key is revealed. We call this property strong key independence. We also give the first constructions of 0-RTT KE which are provably secure in these models, based on the generic assumption that secure non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) exists.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-05-16: last updated
- 2015-12-20: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/1214
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1214,
author = {Britta Hale and Tibor Jager and Sebastian Lauer and Jörg Schwenk},
title = {Simple Security Definitions for and Constructions of 0-RTT Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/1214},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1214}
}