Paper 2015/1220 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/1220 ↗
Two-Round Man-in-the-Middle Security from LPN
Abstract
Secret-key authentication protocols have recently received a considerable amount of attention, and a long line of research has been devoted to devising efficient protocols with security based on the hardness of the learning-parity with noise (LPN) problem, with the goal of achieving low communication and round complexities, as well as highest possible security guarantees. In this paper, we construct 2-round authentication protocols that are secure against sequential man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks with tight reductions to LPN, Field-LPN, or other problems. The best prior protocols had either loose reductions and required 3 rounds (Lyubashevsky and Masny, CRYPTO'13) or had a much larger key (Kiltz et al., EUROCRYPT'11 and Dodis et al., EUROCRYPT'12). Our constructions follow from a new generic deterministic and round-preserving transformation enhancing actively-secure protocols of a special form to be sequentially MIM-secure while only adding a limited amount of key material and computation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-12-23: last updated
- 2015-12-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/1220
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1220,
author = {David Cash and Eike Kiltz and Stefano Tessaro},
title = {Two-Round Man-in-the-Middle Security from LPN},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/1220},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1220}
}