Paper 2015/123 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/123 ↗
Identity-based encryption with (almost) tight security in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext setting
Abstract
We construct an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is tightly secure in a very strong sense. Specifically, we consider a setting with many instances of the scheme and many encryptions per instance. In this setting, we reduce the security of our scheme to a variant of a simple assumption used for a similar purpose by Chen and Wee (Crypto 2013). The security loss of our reduction is O(k) (where k is the security parameter). Our scheme is the first IBE scheme to achieve this strong flavor of tightness under a simple assumption. Technically, our scheme is a variation of the IBE scheme by Chen and Wee. However, in order to “lift” their results to the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext case, we need to develop new ideas. In particular, while we build on (and extend) their high-level proof strategy, we deviate significantly in the low-level proof steps.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-02-26: last updated
- 2015-02-26: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/123
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/123,
author = {Dennis Hofheinz and Jessica Koch and Christoph Striecks},
title = {Identity-based encryption with (almost) tight security in the multi-instance, multi-ciphertext setting},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/123},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/123}
}