Paper 2015/1256 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/1256 ↗
Mitigating Multi-Target Attacks in Hash-based Signatures
Abstract
This work introduces XMSS-T, a new hash-based signature scheme with tight security. Previous hash-based signature schemes are facing a loss of security, linear in performance parameters like the total tree height. Our new scheme can use hash functions with a smaller output length at the same security level, immediately leading to a smaller signature size. XMSS-T is stateful, however, the same techniques also apply directly to the recent stateless hash-based signature scheme SPHINCS (Eurocrypt 2015), and the signature size is improved as a result. Being a little more specific and technical, the tight security stems from new multi-target notions of hash-function properties which we define and analyze. We give precise complexity for breaking these security properties under both classical and quantum generic attacks, thus establishing a reliable estimate for the quantum security of XMSS-T. Especially, we prove quantum upper and lower bounds for the query complexity tailored for cryptographic applications, whereas standard techniques in quantum query complexity have limitations such as they usually only consider worst-case complexity. Our proof techniques may be useful elsewhere. We also implement XMSS-T and compare its performance to that of the most recent stateful hash-based signature scheme XMSS (PQCrypto 2011).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-03-01: last updated
- 2016-01-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/1256
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1256,
author = {Andreas Hülsing and Joost Rijneveld and Fang Song},
title = {Mitigating Multi-Target Attacks in Hash-based Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/1256},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1256}
}