Paper 2015/291 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/291 ↗
Two Operands of Multipliers in Side-Channel Attack
Abstract
The single-shot collision attack on RSA proposed by Hanley et al. is studied focusing on the difference between two operands of multipliers. There are two consequences. Firstly, designing order of operands can be a cost-effective countermeasure. We show a concrete example in which operand order determines success and failure of the attack. Secondly, countermeasures can be ineffective if the asymmetric leakage is considered. In addition to the main results, the attack by Hanley et al. is extended using the signal-processing technique of the big mac attack. An experimental result to successfully analyze an FPGA implementation of RSA with the multiply-always method is also presented.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-04-01: last updated
- 2015-04-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/291
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/291,
author = {Takeshi Sugawara and Daisuke Suzuki and Minoru Saeki},
title = {Two Operands of Multipliers in Side-Channel Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/291},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/291}
}