Paper 2015/365 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/365 ↗
On the (im)possibility of receiving security beyond 2^l using an l-bit PRNG: the case of Wang et. al. protocol
Abstract
Recently,Wang et al. analyzed the security of two EPC C1-G2 compliant RFID authentication protocols, called RAPLT and SRP^+, and proved that these protocols are vulnerable against de-synchronization and secret disclosure attacks. The time complexity of their attacks were O(2^{16}). In addition, they proposed an improved version of SRP^+ entitled SRP^{++}, for which they claim the security would be O(2^{32}). However, in this letter, we analyze the security of SRP^{++} and show that the complexity of retrieving all secret parameters of a given tag is $O(2^{16})$, similar to its predecessor protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-09-13: last updated
- 2015-04-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/365
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/365,
author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Mehdi Hosseinzadeh and Mojtaba Eslamnezhad Namin and Samad Rostampour and Nasour Bagheri},
title = {On the (im)possibility of receiving security beyond 2^l using an l-bit PRNG: the case of Wang et. al. protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/365},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/365}
}