Paper 2015/372 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/372 ↗
Security Analysis of PRINCE
Abstract
In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the $\alpha$ parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-04-24: last updated
- 2015-04-24: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/372
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/372,
author = {Jeremy Jean and Ivica Nikolic and Thomas Peyrin and Lei Wang and Shuang Wu},
title = {Security Analysis of PRINCE},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/372},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/372}
}