Paper 2015/681 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/681 ↗

ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System

Susan Hohenberger
Steven Myers
Rafael Pass
abhi shelat
Abstract

A secure ad-hoc survey scheme enables a survey authority to independently (without any interaction) select an ad-hoc group of registered users based only on their identities (e.g., their email addresses), and create a survey where only selected users can anonymously submit exactly one response. We present a formalization of secure ad-hoc surveys and present: * an abstract provably-secure implementation based on standard cryptographic building blocks (which in particular are implied by the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations in the CRS model); * a practical instantiation of our abstract protocol, called ANONIZE, which is provably-secure in the random oracle model based on cryptographic assumptions on groups with bilinear maps. As far as we know, ANONIZE constitutes the first implementation of a large-scale secure computation protocol (of non-trivial functionalities) that can scale to millions of users.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2015-07-07: last updated
2015-07-07: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/681
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/681,
      author = {Susan Hohenberger and Steven Myers and Rafael Pass and abhi shelat},
      title = {ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/681},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/681}
}
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