Paper 2015/729 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/729 ↗
Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks
Abstract
We initiate the study of provably secure remote memory attestation. We present two protocols offering various efficiency and security trade-offs that detect the presence of injected malicious code in remotely- stored heap memory. While our solutions offer protection only against a specific class of attacks, our novel formal security definitions are general enough to cover a wide range of attacks and settings, and should be useful for further research on the subject.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-12-29: last updated
- 2015-07-21: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/729
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/729,
author = {Alexandra Boldyreva and Taesoo Kim and Richard Lipton and Bogdan Warinschi},
title = {Provably-Secure Remote Memory Attestation to Prevent Heap Overflow Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/729},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/729}
}