Paper 2015/872 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/872 ↗

Traceability Improvements of a New RFID Protocol Based On EPC C1G2

Seyed Salman Sajjadi GhaemMaghami
Afrooz Haghbin
Mahtab Mirmohseni
Abstract

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) applications have spread all over the world and, in order to provide their security and pri-vacy, researchers proposed different kind of protocols. In this pa-per, we analyzes the privacy of a new protocol, proposed by Yu-Jehn in 2015 which is based on Electronic Product Code Class1 Generation 2 (EPC C1 G2) standard. By applying the Ouafi-Phan privacy model, we show that the Yu-Jehn protocol is vulnerable against traceability attack and forward traceability attack and it does not provide the privacy of RFID users. Then, to enhance the privacy of the analyzed protocol, an improved version of the pro-tocol is proposed which eliminates the existing weaknesses of Yu-Jehn protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2015-09-19: last updated
2015-09-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/872
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/872,
      author = {Seyed Salman Sajjadi GhaemMaghami and Afrooz Haghbin and Mahtab Mirmohseni},
      title = {Traceability Improvements of a New RFID Protocol Based On EPC C1G2},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/872},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/872}
}
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