Paper 2015/877 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/877 ↗
Study of a Parity Check Based Fault-Detection Countermeasure for the AES Key Schedule
Abstract
In this paper we study a parity check based countermeasure proposed by Chen et al. that thwarts their attack by detecting byte fault injection during the AES key schedule process. We provide a generalization of their approach that allows to derive parity equations for every AES sizes not given by the authors. We analyze why Chen et al. countermeasure does not properly works. Doing so we are able to extend the coverage of the fault detection to the full expanded key. Finally we suggest optimizations that reduce memory and computation costs, and propose an adaptation to a more general fault model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-09-13: last updated
- 2015-09-13: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/877
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/877,
author = {Christophe Clavier and Julien Francq and Antoine Wurcker},
title = {Study of a Parity Check Based Fault-Detection Countermeasure for the AES Key Schedule},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/877},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/877}
}