Leakage-Resilient Identification Schemes from Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Storage

Giuseppe Ateniese; Antonio Faonio; Seny Kamara

Paper 2015/920 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/920 ↗

Leakage-Resilient Identification Schemes from Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Storage

Giuseppe Ateniese

Antonio Faonio

Seny Kamara

Abstract

We provide a framework for constructing leakage-resilient identification(ID) protocols in the bounded retrieval model (BRM) from proofs of storage(PoS) that hide partial information about the file. More precisely, we describe a generic transformation from any zero-knowledge PoS to a leakage-resilient ID protocol in the BRM. We then describe a ZK-PoS based on RSA which, under our transformation, yields the first ID protocol in the BRM based on RSA (in the ROM). The resulting protocol relies on a different computational assumption and is more efficient than previously-known constructions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2015-09-23: last updated; 2015-09-22: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2015/920
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/920,
      author = {Giuseppe Ateniese and Antonio Faonio and Seny Kamara},
      title = {Leakage-Resilient Identification Schemes from Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Storage},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/920},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/920}
}