Paper 2015/924 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2015/924 ↗
Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece
Abstract
Instantiations of the McEliece cryptosystem which are considered computationally secure even in a post-quantum era still require hardening against side channel attacks for practical applications. Recently, the first differential power analysis attack on a McEliece cryptosystem successfully recovered the full secret key of a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of QC-MDPC McEliece. In this work we show how to apply masking countermeasures to the scheme and present the first masked FPGA implementation that includes these countermeasures. We validate the side channel resistance of our design by practical DPA attacks and statistical tests for leakage detection.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2015-09-22: last updated
- 2015-09-22: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/924
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/924,
author = {Cong Chen and Thomas Eisenbarth and Ingo von Maurich and Rainer Steinwandt},
title = {Masking Large Keys in Hardware: A Masked Implementation of McEliece},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/924},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/924}
}