Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption

Farzaneh abed; Francesco Berti; Stefan Lucks

Paper 2016/1121 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/1121 ↗

Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption

Farzaneh abed

Francesco Berti

Stefan Lucks

Abstract

Leakage-resilient cryptography is about security in the pres- ence of leakage from side-channels. In this paper, we present several issues of the RCB block cipher mode. Agrawal et al [2] proposed recently RCB as a leakage-resilient authenticated encryption (AE) scheme. Our main result is that RCB fails to provide authenticity, even in the absence of leakage.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2016-12-01: last updated; 2016-12-01: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/1121
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/1121,
      author = {Farzaneh abed and Francesco Berti and Stefan Lucks},
      title = {Insecurity of RCB: Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/1121},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1121}
}