Paper 2016/129 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/129 ↗
ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs
Abstract
We present the first physical side-channel attack on elliptic curve cryptography running on a PC. The attack targets the ECDH public-key encryption algorithm, as implemented in the latest version of GnuPG's Libgcrypt. By measuring the target's electromagnetic emanations, the attack extracts the secret decryption key within seconds, from a target located in an adjacent room across a wall. The attack utilizes a single carefully chosen ciphertext, and tailored time-frequency signal analysis techniques, to achieve full key extraction.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-02-17: last updated
- 2016-02-14: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/129
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/129,
author = {Daniel Genkin and Lev Pachmanov and Itamar Pipman and Eran Tromer},
title = {ECDH Key-Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Electromagnetic Attacks on PCs},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/129},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/129}
}