Paper 2016/224 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/224 ↗
CacheBleed: A Timing Attack on OpenSSL Constant Time RSA
Abstract
The scatter-gather technique is a commonly-implemented approach to prevent cache-based timing attacks. In this paper we show that scatter-gather is not constant-time. We implement a cache timing attack against the scatter-gather implementation used in the modular exponentiation routine in OpenSSL version 1.0.2f. Our attack exploits cache-bank conflicts on the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture. We have tested the attack on an Intel Xeon E5-2430 processor. For 4096-bit RSA our attack can fully recover the private key after observing 16,000 decryptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-03-01: last updated
- 2016-03-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/224
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/224,
author = {Yuval Yarom and Daniel Genkin and Nadia Heninger},
title = {CacheBleed: A Timing Attack on OpenSSL Constant Time RSA},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/224},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/224}
}