Paper 2016/225 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/225 ↗
A New Birthday-Type Algorithm for Attacking the Fresh Re-Keying Countermeasure
Abstract
The fresh re-keying scheme is a countermeasure designed to protect low-cost devices against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we present a new birthday-type attack based on a refined reduction to Ring-LPN with a reducible polynomial. Compared with the previous research, our algorithm significantly reduces the time complexity in the 128-bit leakage model—with an SNR equal to 8 and at most $2^{20}$ traces, for instance, the key can be recovered using $2^{41.99}$ bit-operations.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-03-01: last updated
- 2016-03-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/225
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/225,
author = {Qian Guo and Thomas Johansson},
title = {A New Birthday-Type Algorithm for Attacking the Fresh Re-Keying Countermeasure},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/225},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/225}
}