Paper 2016/230 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/230 ↗
ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive Physical Side Channels
Abstract
We show that elliptic-curve cryptography implementations on mobile devices are vulnerable to electromagnetic and power side-channel attacks. We demonstrate full extraction of ECDSA secret signing keys from OpenSSL and CoreBitcoin running on iOS devices, and partial key leakage from OpenSSL running on Android and from iOS's CommonCrypto. These non-intrusive attacks use a simple magnetic probe placed in proximity to the device, or a power probe on the phone's USB cable. They use a bandwidth of merely a few hundred kHz, and can be performed cheaply using an audio card and an improvised magnetic probe.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-08-19: last updated
- 2016-03-02: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/230
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/230,
author = {Daniel Genkin and Lev Pachmanov and Itamar Pipman and Eran Tromer and Yuval Yarom},
title = {ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive Physical Side Channels},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/230},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/230}
}