Paper 2016/290 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/290 ↗
Nonce-Based Cryptography: Retaining Security when Randomness Fails
Abstract
We take nonce-based cryptography beyond symmetric encryption, developing it as a broad and practical way to mitigate damage caused by failures in randomness, whether inadvertent (bugs) or malicious (subversion). We focus on definitions and constructions for nonce-based public-key encryption and briefly treat nonce-based signatures. We introduce and construct hedged extractors as a general tool in this domain. Our nonce-based PKE scheme guarantees that if the adversary wants to violate IND-CCA security then it must do both of the following: (1) fully compromise the RNG (2) penetrate the sender system to exfiltrate a seed used by the sender
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-03-17: last updated
- 2016-03-17: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/290
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/290,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Björn Tackmann},
title = {Nonce-Based Cryptography: Retaining Security when Randomness Fails},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/290},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/290}
}