Paper 2016/372 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/372 ↗

NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion

Mihir Bellare
Georg Fuchsbauer
Alessandra Scafuro
Abstract

Motivated by the subversion of ``trusted'' public parameters in mass-surveillance activities, this paper studies the security of NIZKs in the presence of a maliciously chosen common reference string. We provide definitions for subversion soundness, subversion witness indistinguishability and subversion zero knowledge. We then provide both negative and positive results, showing that certain combinations of goals are unachievable but giving protocols to achieve other combinations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2016-09-08: last updated
2016-04-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/372
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/372,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Georg Fuchsbauer and Alessandra Scafuro},
      title = {NIZKs with an Untrusted CRS: Security in the Face of Parameter Subversion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/372},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/372}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, this archive does not use cookies or embedded third party content.