Paper 2016/373 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/373 ↗

Adaptive partitioning

Dennis Hofheinz
Abstract

We present a new strategy for partitioning proofs, and use it to obtain new tightly secure encryption schemes. Specifically, we provide the following two conceptual contributions: - A new strategy for tight security reductions that leads to compact public keys and ciphertexts. - A relaxed definition of non-interactive proof systems for non-linear (``OR-type'') languages. Our definition is strong enough to act as a central tool in our new strategy to obtain tight security, and is achievable both in pairing-friendly and DCR groups. We apply these concepts in a generic construction of a tightly secure public-key encryption scheme. When instantiated in different concrete settings, we obtain the following: - A public-key encryption scheme whose chosen-ciphertext security can be tightly reduced to the DLIN assumption in a pairing-friendly group. Ciphertexts, public keys, and system parameters contain 6, 24, and 2 group elements, respectively. This improves heavily upon a recent scheme of Gay et al. (Eurocrypt 2016) in terms of public key size, at the cost of using a symmetric pairing. - The first public-key encryption scheme that is tightly chosen-ciphertext secure under the DCR assumption. While the scheme is not very practical (ciphertexts carry 29 group elements), it enjoys constant-size parameters, public keys, and ciphertexts.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2017-01-22: last updated
2016-04-14: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/373
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/373,
      author = {Dennis Hofheinz},
      title = {Adaptive partitioning},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/373},
      year = {2016},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/373}
}
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