Paper 2016/415 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/415 ↗
Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks
Abstract
Due to their high efficiency and their strong security properties, lattice-based cryptographic schemes seem to be a very promising post-quantum replacement for currently used public key cryptography. The security of lattice-based schemes has been deeply analyzed mathematically, whereas little effort has been spent on the analysis against implementation attacks. In this paper, we start with the fault analysis of one of the most important cryptographic primitives: signature schemes. We investigate the vulnerability and resistance of the currently most efficient lattice-based signature schemes BLISS (CRYPTO 2013), ring-TESLA (AfricaCrypt 2016), and the GLP scheme (CHES 2012) and their implementations. We consider different kinds of (first-order) randomizing, zeroing, and skipping faults. For each of the signature schemes, we found at least six effective attacks. To increase the security of lattice-based signature schemes, we propose countermeasures for each of the respective attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-02-22: last updated
- 2016-04-28: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/415
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/415,
author = {Nina Bindel and Johannes Buchmann and Juliane Krämer},
title = {Lattice-Based Signature Schemes and their Sensitivity to Fault Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/415},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/415}
}