Paper 2016/775 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/775 ↗
Cryptanalysis of a Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Abstract
Homomorphic encryption allows to make specific operations on private data which stays encrypted. While applications such as cloud computing require to have a practical solution, the encryption scheme must be secure. In this article, we detail and analyze in-depth the homomorphic encryption scheme proposed by Zhou and Wornell. From the analysis of the encryption scheme, we are able to mount three attacks. The first attack enables to recover a secret plaintext message broadcasted to multiple users. The second attack performs a chosen ciphertext key recovery attack and it was implemented and verified. The last attack is a related chosen plaintext decryption attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-08-12: last updated
- 2016-08-12: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/775
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/775,
author = {Sonia Bogos and John Gaspoz and Serge Vaudenay},
title = {Cryptanalysis of a Homomorphic Encryption Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/775},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/775}
}