Paper 2016/810 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/810 ↗
Fault Injection using Crowbars on Embedded Systems
Abstract
Causing a device to incorrectly execute an instruction or store faulty data is well-known strategy for attacking cryptographic implementations on embedded systems. One technique to generate such faults is to manipulate the supply voltage of the device. This paper introduces a novel technique to introduce those supply voltage manipulations onto existing digital systems, requiring minimal modifications to the device being attacked. This uses a crowbar to short the power supply for controlled periods of time. High-accuracy faults are demonstrated on the 8-bit AVR microcontroller, which can generate both single and multi-bit faults with high repeatability. Additionally this technique is demonstrated on a FPGA where it is capable of generating faults in both internal registers and the configuration fabric.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-08-25: last updated
- 2016-08-25: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/810
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/810,
author = {Colin O'Flynn},
title = {Fault Injection using Crowbars on Embedded Systems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/810},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/810}
}