Paper 2016/841 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/841 ↗
A Methodology for the Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic
Abstract
Glitches represent a great danger for hardware implementations of cryptographic schemes. Their intrinsic random nature makes them difficult to tackle and their occurrence threatens side-channel protections. Although countermeasures aiming at structurally solving the problem already exist, they usually require some effort to be applied or introduce non-negligible overhead in the design. Our work addresses the gap between such countermeasures and the naïve implementation of schemes being vulnerable in the presence of glitches. Our contribution is twofold: (1) we expand the mathematical framework proposed by Brzozowski and Ësik (FMSD 2003) by meaningfully adding the notion of information leakage, (2) thanks to which we define a formal methodology for the analysis of vulnerabilities in combinatorial circuits when glitches are taken into account.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-09-29: last updated
- 2016-09-06: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/841
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/841,
author = {Guido Bertoni and Marco Martinoli},
title = {A Methodology for the Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/841},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/841}
}