Paper 2016/958 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2016/958 ↗
SafeDeflate: compression without leaking secrets
Abstract
CRIME and BREACH attacks on TLS/SSL leverage the fact that compression ratio is not hidden by encryption to recover content of secrets. We introduce SafeDeflate---a modification of a standard Deflate algorithm which compression ratio does not leak information about secret tokens. The modification is compatible with existing Deflate and gzip decompressors. We introduce a model in which attacker can obtain ciphertexts of arbitrary compressed plaintext containing secret values. Then we prove that SafeDeflate is secure in this model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2016-10-04: last updated
- 2016-10-04: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/958
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/958,
author = {Michał Zieliński},
title = {SafeDeflate: compression without leaking secrets},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2016/958},
year = {2016},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/958}
}