Paper 2017/024 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/024 ↗

Searchable Encrypted Relational Databases: Risks and Countermeasures

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem
Tobias Andersson
Christian Gehrmann
Abstract

We point out the risks of protecting relational databases via Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) schemes by proposing an inference attack exploiting the structural properties of relational databases. We show that record-injection attacks mounted on relational databases have worse consequences than their file-injection counterparts on un- structured databases. Moreover, we discuss some techniques to reduce the effectiveness of inference attacks exploiting the access pattern leakage existing in SSE schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates the security of relational databases protected by SSE schemes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2018-05-01: last updated
2017-01-13: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/024
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/024,
      author = {Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem and Tobias Andersson and Christian Gehrmann},
      title = {Searchable Encrypted Relational Databases: Risks and Countermeasures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/024},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/024}
}
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