Paper 2017/057 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/057 ↗
Single--Trace Template Attack on the DES Round Keys of a Recent Smart Card
Abstract
A new template attack on the DES key scheduling is demonstrated that allows recovery of a sufficiently large portion of the DES key of a recent and widely deployed smart card chip with a {\it single} EM (electromagnetic) trace during the Exploitation Phase. Depending on the use case, the remainder of the key may then be found with reasonable brute--force effort on a PC. Remaining rest entropies as low as $\approx 19$ bits have been found for some single--trace attacks, meaning that effectively 37 bits were recovered in a single trace. The nature of single--trace attacks has it that conventional software countermeasures are rendered useless by this attack, and thus the only remaining remedy is a hardware redesign.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-01-31: last updated
- 2017-01-31: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/057
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/057,
author = {Mathias Wagner and Stefan Heyse},
title = {Single--Trace Template Attack on the DES Round Keys of a Recent Smart Card},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/057},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/057}
}