Paper 2017/1054 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/1054 ↗

On the security of another CRC based ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol

Seyed Farhad Aghili
Hamid Mala
Abstract

Design of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for RFID systems conformed with the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard is still a challenging issue in RFID security. Recently, Maurya et al. have proposed a CRC based authentication protocol and claimed that their protocol can resist against all known attacks in RFID systems. However, in this paper we show that their protocol is vulnerable to tag impersonation attack. Moreover, we show that how an attacker can easily trace a target RFID tag. Our analyses show that the success probability of our attacks is “1” while the complexity is only one session eavesdropping, two XORs and one CRC computation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2017-10-31: last updated
2017-10-31: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1054
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1054,
      author = {Seyed Farhad Aghili and Hamid Mala},
      title = {On the security of another CRC based ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1054},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1054}
}
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