Paper 2017/1121 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/1121 ↗

Differential Attacks on LILLIPUT Cipher

Valérie Nachef
Nicolas Marrière
Emmanuel Volte
Abstract

In SAC 2013, Berger et al. defined Extended Generalized Feistel Networks (EGFN) and analyzed their security. Later, they proposed a cipher based on this structure: LILLIPUT. Impossible differential attacks and integral attacks have been mounted on LILLIPUT. We propose a tool which has found some classical, impossible and improbable differential attacks by using the variance method. It has highlighted unusual differential conditions which lead to efficient attacks by the complexity. Moreover, it is the first time we apply the generic variance method to a concrete cipher.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2017-11-24: last updated
2017-11-24: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1121
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1121,
      author = {Valérie Nachef and Nicolas Marrière and Emmanuel Volte},
      title = {Differential Attacks on LILLIPUT Cipher},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1121},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1121}
}
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