Paper 2017/1162 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/1162 ↗
Kayawood, a Key Agreement Protocol
Abstract
Public-key solutions based on number theory, including RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman, are subject to various quantum attacks, which makes such solutions less attractive long term. Certain group theoretic constructs, however, show promise in providing quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives because of the infinite, non-cyclic, non-abelian nature of the underlying mathematics. This paper introduces Kayawood Key Agreement protocol (Kayawood, or Kayawood KAP), a new group-theoretic key agreement protocol, that leverages the known NP-Hard shortest word problem (among others) to provide an Elgamal-style, Diffie-Hellman-like method. This paper also (i) discusses the implementation of and behavioral aspects of Kayawood, (ii) introduces new methods to obfuscate braids using Stochastic Rewriting, and (iii) analyzes and demonstrates Kayawood's security and resistance to known quantum attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-11-30: last updated
- 2017-11-30: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1162
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1162,
author = {Iris Anshel and Derek Atkins and Dorian Goldfeld and Paul E Gunnells},
title = {Kayawood, a Key Agreement Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1162},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1162}
}