Paper 2017/1214 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/1214 ↗
HILA5 Pindakaas: On the CCA security of lattice-based encryption with error correction
Abstract
We show that the NISTPQC submission HILA5 is not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate a key-recovery attack on HILA5 using an active attack on reused keys. The attack works around the error correction in HILA5. The attack applies to the HILA5 key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), and also to the public-key encryption mechanism (PKE) obtained by NIST's procedure for combining the KEM with authenticated encryption. This contradicts the most natural interpretation of the IND-CCA security claim for HILA5.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-03-09: last updated
- 2017-12-18: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1214
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1214,
author = {Daniel J. Bernstein and Leon Groot Bruinderink and Tanja Lange and Lorenz Panny},
title = {HILA5 Pindakaas: On the CCA security of lattice-based encryption with error correction},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1214},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1214}
}