Cryptanalysis of HK17

Haoyu Li; Renzhang Liu; Yanbin Pan; Tianyuan Xie

Paper 2017/1259 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/1259 ↗

Cryptanalysis of HK17

Haoyu Li

Renzhang Liu

Yanbin Pan

Tianyuan Xie

Abstract

Very recently, a key exchange scheme called HK17 was submitted to NIST as a candidate of the standard of post-quantum cryptography. The HK17 scheme employs some hypercomplex numbers as the basic objects, such as quaternions and octonions. In this paper, we show that HK17 is insecure since a passive adversary can recover the shared key in polynomial time.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
History: 2017-12-31: last updated; 2017-12-31: published
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/1259
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1259,
      author = {Haoyu Li and Renzhang Liu and Yanbin Pan and Tianyuan Xie},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of HK17},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1259},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1259}
}