Paper 2017/167 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/167 ↗
Cloud Storage File Recoverability
Abstract
Data loss is perceived as one of the major threats for cloud storage. Consequently, the security community developed several challenge-response protocols that allow a user to remotely verify whether an outsourced file is still intact. However, two important practical problems have not yet been considered. First, clients commonly outsource multiple files of different sizes, raising the question how to formalize such a scheme and in particular ensuring that all files can be simultaneously audited. Second, in case auditing of the files fails, existing schemes do not provide a client with any method to prove if the original files are still recoverable. We address both problems and describe appropriate solutions. The first problem is tackled by providing a new type of "Proofs of Retrievability" scheme, enabling a client to check all files simultaneously in a compact way. The second problem is solved by defining a novel procedure called "Proofs of Recoverability", enabling a client to obtain an assurance whether a file is recoverable or irreparably damaged. Finally, we present a combination of both schemes allowing the client to check the recoverability of all her original files, thus ensuring cloud storage file recoverability.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-04-25: last updated
- 2017-02-23: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/167
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/167,
author = {Christian A. Gorke and Christian Janson and Frederik Armknecht and Carlos Cid},
title = {Cloud Storage File Recoverability},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/167},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/167}
}