Paper 2017/358 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/358 ↗

Almost Optimal Oblivious Transfer from QA-NIZK

Olivier Blazy
Céline Chevalier
Paul Germouty
Abstract

We show how to build a UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the presence of Adaptive Corruptions from Quasi-Adaptive Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs. Our result is based on the work of Jutla and Roy at Asiacrypt 2015, where the authors proposed a constant-size very efficient PAKE scheme. As a stepping stone, we first show how a two-flow PAKE scheme can be generically transformed in an optimized way, in order to achieve an efficient three-flow Oblivious-Transfer scheme. We then compare our generic transformations to existing OT constructions and see that we manage to gain at least a factor 2 to the best known constructions. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first UC-secure Oblivious Transfer with a constant size flow from the receiver, and nearly optimal size for the server.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
History
2017-04-26: last updated
2017-04-26: published
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/358
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/358,
      author = {Olivier Blazy and Céline Chevalier and Paul Germouty},
      title = {Almost Optimal Oblivious Transfer from QA-NIZK},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/358},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/358}
}
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