Paper 2017/374 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/374 ↗
Loop-abort faults on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems
Abstract
Cryptographic schemes based on supersingular isogenies have become an active area of research in the field of post-quantum cryptography. We investigate the resistance of these cryptosystems to fault injection attacks. It appears that the iterative structure of the secret isogeny computation renders these schemes vulnerable to loop-abort attacks. Loop-abort faults allow to perform a full key recovery, bypassing all the previously introduced validation methods. Therefore implementing additional countermeasures seems unavoidable for applications where physical attacks are relevant.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2018-06-11: last updated
- 2017-05-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/374
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/374,
author = {Alexandre Gélin and Benjamin Wesolowski},
title = {Loop-abort faults on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/374},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/374}
}