Paper 2017/379 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/379 ↗
Fault attack on Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems
Abstract
We present the first fault attack on cryptosystems based on supersingular isogenies. During the computation of the auxiliary points, the attack aims to change the base point to a random point on the curve via a fault injection. We will show that this would reveal the secret isogeny with one successful perturbation with high probability. We will exhibit the attack by placing it against signature schemes and key-exchange protocols with validations in place. Our paper therefore demonstrates the need to incorporate checks in implementations of the cryptosystem.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-05-08: last updated
- 2017-05-01: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/379
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/379,
author = {Yan Bo Ti},
title = {Fault attack on Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/379},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/379}
}