Paper 2017/476 Original: eprint.iacr.org/2017/476 ↗
Forward-Security under Continual Leakage
Abstract
Current signature and encryption schemes secure against continual leakage fail completely if the key in any time period is fully exposed. We suggest forward security as a second line of defense, so that in the event of full exposure of the current secret key, at least uses of keys prior to this remain secure, a big benefit in practice. (For example if the signer is a certificate authority, full exposure of the current secret key would not invalidate certificates signed under prior keys.) We provide definitions for signatures and encryption that are forward-secure under continual leakage. Achieving these definitions turns out to be challenging, and we make initial progress with some constructions and transforms.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
PDF- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- History
- 2017-10-10: last updated
- 2017-05-29: published
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/476
- License
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/476,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Adam O'Neill and Igors Stepanovs},
title = {Forward-Security under Continual Leakage},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/476},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/476}
}